The new citizenship landscape

For many Italian Americans, Italian citizenship by descent has long represented more than a legal status. It has often been seen as a way to reconnect with family history, preserve an Italian identity across generations, and formalize a bond with the country of origin of parents, grandparents or great-grandparents.

After the 2025 reform, however, the legal landscape has changed significantly. Italian citizenship by descent has not disappeared, but it is no longer an almost automatic consequence of having a remote Italian ancestor who retained Italian citizenship when the first American generation was born.

The key recent development is the long-awaited decision of the Italian Constitutional Court, judgment no. 63 of 2026, filed on April 30, 2026, in which the Court was asked to rule on the legality of recent reforms. The Court rejected the main constitutional challenges brought against the new Article 3-bis of Law no. 91 of 1992, introduced by Decree-Law no. 36 of 2025 and later converted into Law no. 74 of 2025, at least with reference to Articles 2 and 3 of the Italian Constitution and Articles 9 TEU and 20 TFEU.

In practical terms, the Court held that the Italian Parliament may restrict the potentially unlimited transmission of citizenship by bloodline. Citizenship, according to this new approach, does not necessarily have to pass indefinitely across generations to individuals born abroad, already holding another citizenship, and lacking an effective connection with Italy.

The concept of an “effective link” with the Italian national community, and therefore with the European community, is now central to the analysis.

This is the heart of the matter: Italian citizenship by descent still exists, but its legal nature has changed. For many applicants, it is no longer enough to poinpoint an Italian ancestor several generations back who was still an Italian citizen when the first American generation was born.

Under the new Article 3-bis, a person born abroad, even before the reform entered into force, and holding another citizenship is, for the purposes of the new provision, considered never to have acquired Italian citizenship, unless one of the statutory exceptions applies.

The main exceptions include cases where a complete administrative application had already been filed by 11:59 p.m., Rome time, on March 27, 2025; cases where the application is filed on the date of an appointment that had already been communicated by the competent office by that same deadline; cases where citizenship status is judicially established following a court application filed by that deadline; cases where a parent, adoptive parent, or grandparent held, or held at the time of death, exclusively Italian citizenship; and cases where a parent or adoptive parent had resided in Italy for at least two continuous years after acquiring Italian citizenship and before the birth or adoption of the child.

For Italian Americans, the relevant question is therefore no longer simply: “Was my great-grandfather Italian?” The more precise question is now: “Do I fall within one of the statutory exceptions required by Italian law?”

This does not mean that the prior legal framework was unconstitutional. Before judgment no. 63 of 2026, the Constitutional Court had issued judgment no. 142 of 2025, addressing the legitimacy of the previous system of citizenship transmission without generational limits. In that decision, the Court did not find the old system unconstitutional, but it also recognized the broad discretion of Parliament in matters of citizenship.

The refined point is therefore this: the old regime was not unconstitutional, but it was not constitutionally mandatory either. Parliament could change it. With judgment no. 63 of 2026, the Constitutional Court has substantially confirmed the validity of the new restrictive framework.

This is important because the reform should not be read in overly dramatic terms. It is not accurate to say that “everything is over,” nor that Italian heritage has been legally erased. The better reading is that Italy has moved from a potentially unlimited genealogical model of citizenship to a more selective model, conditioned on a closer or more effective connection with Italy.

Recent lower court decisions already show the practical consequences of the reform.

One significant example is the decision of the Tribunal of Palermo, judgment no. 2456 of April 14, 2026. The case concerned individuals residing abroad who claimed Italian citizenship by descent from an Italian ancestor who had emigrated to Brazil and had never become a Brazilian citizen. The applicants were descendants in the third, fourth and fifth degree from the Italian ancestor.

The Tribunal rejected the claim, applying the new rules introduced by Decree-Law no. 36 of 2025, converted into Law no. 74 of 2025. The court held that the new Article 3-bis limits the automatic transmission of Italian citizenship to persons born abroad and holding another citizenship, requiring the existence of specific statutory conditions. In particular, the law provides that a person born abroad and holding another citizenship does not acquire Italian citizenship unless one of the listed exceptions applies. One of those exceptions concerns the existence of a first- or second-degree ancestor who held, or held at the time of death, exclusively Italian citizenship.

In that case, because the applicants were descendants in the third, fourth and fifth degree, the court found that they did not fall within the categories protected by the new law. The claim was therefore dismissed, despite the applicants’ arguments concerning the difficulties they had encountered in securing an appointment with the competent consulate before the reform entered into force. The court noted that, although they had complained about those difficulties, they could have brought a judicial action earlier and had instead remained inactive until after the law had changed.

This shows that lower courts may distinguish sharply between applications “saved” because they were filed by March 27, 2025, and later applications, especially where the claim is based on a more remote Italian ancestor.

At the same time, judicial remedies remain relevant in certain cases.

Some recent decisions continue to recognize, in appropriate cases, the right to bring a judicial action where the consular route is ineffective, excessively delayed, or practically unavailable. The Tribunal of Florence, judgment no. 1176 of March 5, 2026, confirmed that in citizenship matters the applicant must prove the acquisition of citizenship and the line of transmission, while the opposing party must raise and prove any interrupting event. The court also recognized the continuing relevance of the constitutional and Supreme Court case law concerning transmission through the maternal line and loss of citizenship by marriage to a foreign citizen.

However, after the 2025 reform, the existence of an interest in bringing judicial proceedings does not, by itself, overcome the substantive limits introduced by the new Article 3-bis. In other words, the question is no longer only whether an applicant may access the courts, but also whether the applicant still falls within one of the categories protected by the new law.

There are also still favorable decisions in so-called “1948 cases,” namely cases involving transmission of citizenship through a female ancestor before the entry into force of the Italian Constitution. The Tribunal of Bologna, judgment no. 3689 of April 28, 2026, recognized the existence of an interest in bringing a judicial claim even without first attempting the administrative procedure, where the administration cannot guarantee an effective and timely recognition of the right, or where the administrative application would clearly be rejected based on the consolidated

This remains relevant for Italian Americans because some cases may still require judicial review, particularly where the issue concerns historical discrimination in the transmission of citizenship through the female line before 1948, or where effective administrative recognition is practically unavailable. However, the need to go to court should not be confused with the substantive requirements introduced by the new Article 3-bis. A potential “1948 case” may justify bringing the matter before a court, but it does not automatically place the applicant within one of the statutory exceptions preserved by the new law. The applicant’s position must therefore still be assessed under the new substantive rules, case by case.

The practical takeaway is simple but important: ancestry alone may no longer be enough.

For Italian descendants abroad, and particularly for Italian Americans, a proper legal assessment must now focus on the entire line of descent, the date and type of any naturalization, the existence of female-line transmission before 1948, the date on which any application was filed, whether an administrative appointment had already been communicated by the relevant deadline, and the possible application of the statutory exceptions introduced by the reform.

The 2025 reform does not erase Italian heritage. But it does make clear that, for legal purposes, heritage and citizenship are no longer treated as the same thing. For Italian descendants abroad, especially in the United States, the key step is now a careful legal review before investing time, money, and expectations in a citizenship application.

Send your questions regarding Italian law to cbortolani@aliantlaw.com and I’ll be glad to answer them.

The content provided in this Q&A column is intended solely for general informational purposes and does not constitute legal advice. The information presented here is not tailored to any specific situation or transaction and should not be relied upon as a substitute for professional legal counsel. Legal issues can vary widely based on individual circumstances and jurisdictional nuances. Therefore, it is crucial to consult with a qualified legal professional regarding your specific case or concerns. Please be aware that no attorney-client relationship is established by accessing or interacting with the information provided in this column. The column’s author and publisher disclaim any liability for actions taken based on the information contained herein.